

DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR THE DELEGATION OF DECLASSIFICATION  
AUTHORITY FOR CIA AND PREDECESSOR AGENCY DOCUMENTS AND  
INFORMATION ORIGINATED BETWEEN 1946-1950 TO DESIGNATED  
NARS PERSONNEL

I. The Director of Central Intelligence exercises exclusive or final declassification authority over all documents and information originated by or clearly attributable to the Central Intelligence Agency and its postwar predecessors, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) of the War Department (1945-1946) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG, 1946-1947). In addition, the CIA has a subject matter interest in documents and information originated by or attributable to other agencies which relate to the personnel, organization, functions, and responsibilities of the CIA and to similar documents and information of inter-agency bodies with which the CIA was associated, such as the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), and the National Security Council (NSC).

II. These guidelines apply only to documents and information originated by or clearly attributable to the Central Intelligence Agency and its predecessors and over which the Central Intelligence Agency now exercises exclusive or final declassification authority. Any guidelines and declassification instructions issued by any other federal

→ applied to documents and information originated and clearly attributable to them. The Central Intelligence Agency does not exercise final declassification authority over non-CIA material.

III. In accordance with Section 5 of Executive Order 11652, the Central Intelligence Agency delegates the following declassification authority to selected staff members of the Records Declassification Division (NND) of NARS, after suitable briefing by CIA personnel. All classified documents and information originated by or clearly attributable to the Central Intelligence Agency, its predecessors, and inter-agency bodies upon which the CIA was represented which relate to the personnel, organization, functions, and responsibilities of the CIA (or its predecessors), may be declassified, if dated between 1 January 1946 and 30 June 1950, unless the following types of information is present:

(1) documents and information received in confidence from a foreign intelligence service through liaison channels, whether that liaison source is stated or inferred;

(2) information which discloses the identity (for example, by name, title or function) of any personnel, including agents and liaison officers, of foreign intelligence or security services, irrespective of whether they represent friendly or unfriendly countries;

intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and related matters;

(4) information which names or effectively reveals the identity of any CIA human or technical source, either actual or planned;

(5) information which reveals the non-official cover (NOC) of personnel employed by the CIA and its predecessors or the nature of the NOC arrangement;

(6) information revealing arrangements for the placing and supporting of personnel of the CIA and its predecessors under official cover;

(7) information revealing the covert connection of CIA or predecessor agency personnel with other government agencies of the United States Government, inter-agency boards and committees outside the intelligence community, and with non-governmental organizations;

(8) information revealing any aspect of agent spotting, recruitment, development, handling or support, the assignment of tasks, the levying of requirements, and the agent's manner of response and means of reporting or contact;

(9) information disclosing the manner and degree of support (including financial and administrative) given by the CIA and its predecessors to foreign governments, organizations, and movements, and the means used to obtain and transmit such support;

(3) information concerning  
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→ operating characteristics of special equipment and devices used or developed by the CIA and its predecessors to support operations in the field;

(11) information revealing the appropriation and budgeting of CIA funds, the internal distribution of those funds, and the techniques by which confidential funds are secretly placed within the appropriations for other government agencies;

(12) documents and information pertaining to the letting of contracts by the CIA to private businesses, commercial enterprises, or non-governmental institutions;

(13) documents and information pertaining to the personnel, organization, responsibilities, and functions of the CIA and its predecessors which were originated by or clearly attributable to inter-governmental multi-agency organizations upon which the CIA or its predecessors were represented and/or to which they reported;

(14) documents and information identifying American citizens, businesses, and non-governmental organizations upon whom the CIA was reporting;

(15) information which could have an adverse current impact on the conduct of present U.S. foreign relations, or present relations between two or more foreign states;

(10) information disclosing the design and

information which could place an individual  
in jeopardy.

IV. All documents and information exempted from declassification by NARS personnel by any of the provisions cited above will be reviewed by CIA officers. Routine references to the CIA or its predecessors in the correspondence, memoranda, and other papers which were originated by other government agencies may be declassified. Classified documents originated by the CIA and its predecessors are automatically downgraded to "Confidential." This authority may not be redelegated to any other component, either custodial or administrative, of NARS. No declassification authority issued by any other agency of the United States Government will apply to information originated by the CIA and its predecessors appearing in documents originated by those agencies.

(16) information which could place an individual

Addendum: Major Questions Asked By NARS

1. Is the fact of foreign liaison to be protected or the source, or both? What about unofficial source?
  2. Is foreign liaison information to be identified for the CIA, the country of origin, or both?
  3. Can the CIA declassify its interests in foreign liaison documents?
  4. Can a distinction be made between conventional and confidential sources?
  5. Is the use of coded identity a source problem?
  6. Can the CIA component responsible for reviewing documents and information under each restriction be specifically identified in final guideline?
  7. Must the National Security Agency automatically see all information relating to COMINT, ELINT, and related matters, even if originated by the CIA?
  8. Can an overt definition of "non-official cover" be supplied NARS reviewers?
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10. Can a list be prepared giving those inter-governmental bodies upon which the CIA was overtly represented, and by whom?

11. Is the fact of a CIA covert connection on a body described in #7 to be protected or the name of the representative, or the information revealed?

12. Does information pertaining to the internal organization of the CIG/CIA for the 1946-1950 period still require protection, since so much is in print? If so, distribution lists of CIA documents will pose a problem.

13. Can the organizational titles of CIA components engaged in the development of special equipment be identified, if only by initial?

14. Is there any way NARS personnel could recognize and cover organization engaged in CIA contracting?



12. Does information pertain to the internal organization?

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
		SECRET	
<b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	D/OCR		
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X	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b>  Re 30-Year Declassification Review:  Here is a copy of the "Draft Guidelines" which evidently were distributed during or before the EAG meeting on 1 March. I got these "guidelines" from Ellie near the end of last week, after my talk with Sayre Stevens about the EAG decision. I had not at that time seen the guidelines, but told Sayre that you and I would both review them. He said that we could respond directly (presumably to [redacted]). I suggest we consult after you have had a chance to go over them.			
<b>FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER</b>			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
[redacted]			8 Mar 77
			SECRET

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